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Abstract
Monitoring and assessing systemic risk in financial markets is of great
importance but it often requires data that are unavailable or available at a
very low frequency. For this reason, systemic risk assessment with partial
information is potentially very useful for regulators and other stakeholders.
In this paper we consider systemic risk due to fire sales spillovers and portfolio
rebalancing by using the risk metrics defined by Greenwood et al. (2015). By
using a method based on the constrained minimization of the Cross Entropy,
we show that it is possible to assess aggregated and single bank’s systemicness
and vulnerability, using only the information on the size of each bank and
the capitalization of each investment asset. We also compare our approach
with an alternative widespread application of the Maximum Entropy principle
allowing to derive graph probability distributions and generating scenarios
and we use it to propose a statistical test for a change in banks’ vulnerability
to systemic events.
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1 Introduction
After the recent troubled years for the global economy, in which two severe crises
(the 2007 crisis of financial markets and the 2010 sovereign debt crisis) have put
the whole economic system in dramatic distress, vulnerability of banks to systemic
events is now the main focus of a growing number of investigations of the academic
community. Simultaneously, many research efforts are devoted to understand the
role of banks or, broadly speaking, of financial institutions in the creation and in
the spreading of systemic risk. Given the prominent importance of the topic and
its multifaceted nature, the literature on evaluation and anticipation of systemic
events is huge (see Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart,
1999; Harrington, 2009; Scheffer et al., 2009; Barrell et al., 2010; Duttagupta and
Cashin, 2011; Kritzman et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2012; Arnold et al., 2012; Bisias
et al., 2012; Scheffer et al., 2012; Merton et al., 2013; Oet et al., 2013, among many
contributions).
Several are the channels through which financial distress may propagate from one
institution to another and, eventually, affect a vast portion of the global economy.
Fire sales spillovers due to assets’ illiquidity and common portfolio holdings are
definitely one of the main drivers of systemic risk. Shared investments create a
significant overlap of portfolios between couples of financial institutions. Such (indi-
rect) financial interconnectedness is an important source of contagion, since partial
liquidation of assets by a single market player is expected to affect all other market
participants that share with it a large fraction of their own investments (see Corsi
et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2013; Caccioli et al., 2014; Lillo and Pirino, 2015). Fire
sales move prices due to the finite liquidity of assets and to market impact. In
a perfectly liquid market there will be no fire sale contagion at all (see Adrian
and Shin, 2008, for a review on the role of liquidity in financial contagion). Finally,
leverage amplifies such feedbacks. In fact, as described in detail by Adrian and Shin
(2010, 2014), levered institutions continuously rebalance their positions inflating
positive and, most importantly, negative assets’ price variations.
Assessing and monitoring systemic risk due to fire sales spillover is therefore of
paramount importance for regulators, policy makers, and other participants to the
financial markets. Greenwood et al. (2015) introduced recently a stylized model of
fire sales, where illiquidity, target leverage, and portfolio overlap are the constituent
bricks. They used the model to propose two systemic risk metrics: systemicness
and vulnerability of a bank. Given a market shock, the first is the total percentage
loss induced on the system by the distress of the bank, whereas the second is the
total percentage loss experienced by the bank when the whole system is in distress.
In order to compute these quantities, a full knowledge of the portfolio composition
of all banks is needed, because the systemicness and vulnerability of a bank depends
on the portfolio and leverage of the other banks.
Greenwood et al. (2015) applied their method to the European Banking Authority
(EBA) data that resulted from the July 2011 European stress tests. These data
provide detailed balance sheets for the 90 largest banks in the European Union.
Duarte and Eisenbach (2013) exploited a publicly available dataset of balance sheets
of US bank holding companies to apply the framework of Greenwood et al. (2015).
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They derive a measure of aggregate vulnerability that [...] reaches a peak in the fall
of 2008 but shows a notable increase starting in 2005, ahead of many other systemic
risk indicators.
In general, however, the detailed information set required to compute such systemic
risk indicators might not be available. For example European stress test data are
sporadic. Moreover the sampling frequency of balance sheet data is rarely higher
than quarterly. Thus an important question is whether it is possible to estimate
systemic risk due to fire sales spillovers in absence of data on portfolio composition
of financial intermediaries.
Two possible approaches have been proposed in the literature. The first one (see,
among others, Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Acharya et al., 2012; Banulescu
and Dumitrescu, 2015; Corsi et al., 2015) is purely econometric and it is typically
based on publicly available data on price of assets and market equity value of pub-
licly quoted financial institutions. Generically the method consists in estimating
conditional variables, such as conditional Value-at-Risk or conditional Expected
Shortfall. The econometric approach circumvents the unavailability of data on
portfolio holdings, but pays this advantage with the introduction of a strong sta-
tionarity assumption: estimates based on the past information are assumed to be
always good predictors of the future behavior of the system. Nevertheless, due to
the nature of a global financial crisis, it is in the very moment of the onset of a
period of distress that the stationarity assumption may fail to work properly. More-
over it is often restricted to publicly quoted institutions for which equity value are
available at daily frequency.
A second possible approach1, followed in the present paper, consists in inferring the
matrix of portfolio holdings using only a reduced, but easily available, information
set, and/or deriving a probability distribution for the portfolio weights according to
some criterion. This is typically achieved summoning the maximum entropy prin-
ciple which postulates that (Anand et al., 2013) [...] subject to known constraints
[...] the probability distribution that best represents our current knowledge and that
is least biased is the one with maximal entropy. The approach of Maximum En-
tropy, can be applied in at least two different ways that we distinguish clearly in
the following, and is not new in systemic risk studies (Mistrulli, 2011; Anand et al.,
2013; Musmeci et al., 2013; Squartini et al., 2013; Bargigli et al., 2015). It is widely
used for inferring the structure of the interbank network when only data of total
interbank lending and borrowing for each bank (plus possibly other information)
are available (for a comparison of different methods, see Anand et al., 2017; Gandy
and Veraart, 2016).
The seminal contribution by Mistrulli (2011), comparing the empirical Italian in-
terbank network with that reconstructed via a Maximum Entropy optimization
procedure, has shown that the latter is fully connected while the former is very
sparse (see also Mastromatteo et al. (2012)) and,as a consequence of this mises-
timation, the reconstructed network underestimates the risk contagion2. Recently
1There are, of course, many different approach to assess systemic risk in financial networks.
For example, Amini et al. (2013) propose a rigorous asymptotic theory that allows to predict the
spread of distress in interbank networks.
2A complementary method is proposed by Anand et al. (2015). Here the authors reconstruct
3
a comparison of network reconstructions techniques has been carried out also for
bipartite networks (Ramadiah et al., 2017).
A part from network reconstruction, the use of entropic methods is widespread in
economic sciences. For example, it is widely used in econometrics for the estimation
of probability densities, as it is witnessed by a vast stream of contributions in this
direction (see, among others, the contributions by Zellner and Highfield, 1988; Ryu,
1993; Wu, 2003; Kouskoulas et al., 2004; Park and Bera, 2009; Usta and Kantar,
2011; Chen, 2015). An interesting point of coomparison for our paper is the use
of entropy in the theory of portfolio choice3. When investors are uncertain about
the probability structure of reality and, being averse to ambiguity, use the relative
entropy as a way of penalizing (see, among the most notable contributions in this
field, the works by Hansen and Sargent, 2001; Maccheroni et al., 2006; Bera and
Park, 2008; Zhou et al., 2008; Gilboa and Marinacci, 2016; Zhou et al., 2013). In
this respect it is important to clarify that we implicitly adopt the maximum entropy
principle from the point of view of a regulator (or a social planner) who, irrespec-
tively of the decisional process which is behind the creation of the network, is solely
interested in having an unbiased estimate of systemic risk. Hence, our perspective
could be thought as orthogonal to that adopted by the ambiguity aversion litera-
ture, in the sense that our declination of the maximum entropy principle is purely
inferential and it is not meant to mimic, in any way, the banks’ decisional processes
that have created the network and, accordingly, the prevailing level of systemic risk.
In this paper we propose to apply maximum entropy approach to the inference of the
network of portfolio weights in order to estimate metrics of systemic risk due to fire
sales spillovers. Specifically, we show how indirect vulnerability, systemicness (as
defined by Greenwood et al., 2015) and the aggregate systemic risk of US commercial
banks can be estimated when only a partial information (the size of each bank and
the capitalization of each asset) is available. Differently from the interbank studies
(as in Mistrulli, 2011; Mastromatteo et al., 2012; Anand et al., 2015) we deal with
bipartite networks, namely graphs4 whose nodes can be divided into two sharply
distinguished sets that, in our case, are commercial banks and asset classes. More
specifically, we analyze the quarterly networks of US commercial banks’ exposures in
the period 2001-2013 using the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC) through the Call Report files5. We compute, for each quarter, systemicness
and vulnerability of each bank and the aggregate vulnerability of the system. We
compare them with the values inferred assuming the balance sheet compositions of
the banks were not known. In this sense our paper is similar to Mistrulli (2011),
but applied to systemic risk due to fire sale spillover rather than to cascades in
the interbank network. Differently from the interbank case, we find that newly
the network of bilateral exposures for the German banking system via the matrix that, preserving
some constraints, has the minimum density. Nevertheless, if cross entropy method underestimates
systemic risk by overestimating the network density, Anand et al. (2015) show that, for a similar
reason, minimum density returns positively biased estimates. Hence, the two approaches can be
used jointly together to create a corridor in which the true systemic risk should lay.
3We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
4Throughout all the manuscript we use the terms “network” and “graph” interchangeably.
5Hence our dataset is quite similar to that adopted by Duarte and Eisenbach (2013), but it
profits from a larger sample of banks, since commercial banks are fairly more numerous than bank
holding companies. All data are available at: https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/
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introduced maximum entropy methods are very accurate in assessing systemic risk
due to fire sales spillover when partial information is available.
The contribution of this paper is divided into two main parts. First, following a
practice that is largely diffused among researchers of both academic institutions and
central banks (see, among others, Sheldon and Maurer, 1998; Upper and Worms,
2004; Wells, 2004; Mistrulli, 2011; Sachs, 2014), we reconstruct the matrix of port-
folio holdings as such that minimizes the cross entropy (or Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence) from a initial guess. Despite this approach has often been referred to as
maximum entropy, or matrix balancing, in order to avoid confusions with different
methods discussed in the following, we refer to it as Cross-Entropy method. We
show that this approach does a very good job in our case, providing unbiased es-
timates of the systemic risk metrics defined by Greenwood et al. (2015). Besides,
we show that the reconstructed matrix corresponds to that implied by the Capital
Asset Pricing Model, hence it possesses a clear economic meaning.
Second, we compare Cross-Entropy with a different approach to entropy maximiza-
tion, which allows to define a probability mass function for graphs (ensemble) by
maximizing entropy under suitable constraints where some average quantities are
set equal to the ones observed in data. Despite the economic intuition of this
approach is less sharp than the previous one, the method is widespread in the lit-
erature and allows performing scenario generation. We propose a new ensemble,
termed MECAPM, which (i) satisfies a set of economically motivated constraints,
(ii) behaves in average as the cross entropy method proposed before, and (iii) al-
lows for scenario generation, potentially useful for supervisory authorities to test if
a specific institution has increased its systemicness with respect to the past.
We structure our paper as follows. Section 2 introduces some nomenclature and
briefly describes the risk metrics of Greenwood et al. (2015). The dataset of US
commercial banks provided by the FFIEC is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4
we present the cross entropy method and show its performances for the estimation
of systemic risk. In Section 5 we compare the cross entropy method with the
maximum entropy alternative which derives a probability distribution of graphs.
This is useful, among other things, to introduce a statistical test for surveillance
activities by central banks and other regulatory institutions. Finally Section 6
summarizes the main contributions of the paper. Appendices provide additional
information on the construction of the dataset of bank portfolio holdings and all
the analytical computations omitted in the main text.
2 Systemic risk metrics: Vulnerability and Sys-
temicness
In this paper we use some metrics of systemic risk due to fire sales, which have been
recently introduced by Greenwood et al. (2015). They consider a system composed
by N banks and K asset classes. Portfolio holdings are described by the N × K
matrix X, whose element Xn,k is the dollar-amount of k-type assets detained by
bank n. The corresponding matrix of portfolio weights is thus
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Wn,k (X) =
Xn,k∑K
k′=1Xn,k′
.
In what follows, we introduce a discretization of the elements of X’s, in such a way
that the matrix X belongs to the space NN×K of N × K integer valued matrices.
In the empirical application we will use the resolution of the dataset which is 103$.
The total asset size An of the n-th bank and the total capitalization
6 Ck of the k-th
asset class are easily computed as, respectively, the total row and column sums of
the matrix Xn,k, in formula
An (X) =
K∑
k=1
Xn,k, Ck (X) =
N∑
n=1
Xn,k, (1)
where we have explicitly expressed the dependence of An and Ck from X.
The rectangular matrix X can be naturally associated to a bipartite network, i.e.
a graph whose vertices can be divided into two disjoint sets such that every edge
connects a vertex in one set to one in the other set, the two sets being the banks and
the asset classes. In the network jargon, An (X) and Ck (X) are called the strength
sequences.
A relevant information concerning the balance sheet of each bank n is the total eq-
uity En, from which one can compute the leverage as Bn =
An−En
En
(as in Greenwood
et al., 2015). Finally, each asset class is characterized by an illiquidity parameter
`k, with k = 1, ..., K, defined as the return per dollar of net purchase of asset k
7.
This setting is used in Greenwood et al. (2015) to define three metrics of systemic
risk, capturing the effect of fire sales in response to a shock on the price of the
assets. This is described by the K dimensional vector −ε = (−ε1, ...,−εK), whose
components are the assets’ shocks. They define:
• Aggregate vulnerability AV as [...] the percentage of aggregate bank equity
that would be wiped out by bank deleveraging if there was a shock [...] to asset
returns.
• Bank systemicness Sn as the contribution of bank n to aggregate vulnera-
bility.
• Bank’s indirect vulnerability IVn as [...] the impact of the shock on its
equity through the deleveraging of other banks.
By assuming that banks follow the practice of leverage targeting and that, in re-
sponse to a negative asset shock, they sell assets proportionally to their pre-shock
6More precisely, the quantity Ck is the total amount of asset’s k capitalization due to the
banking sector. To simplify the notation we will call it capitalization.
7The assumption of linear price impact comes directly from the framework of Greenwood et al.
(2015). Although a square-root law fits the data better, the linear assumption has been widely
adopted in the literature (see Gatheral et al., 2012; Cont and Wagalath, 2014; Lillo and Pirino,
2015, among others) and has been empirically validated at daily frequency by Obizhaeva (2008).
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portfolio holdings, Greenwood et al. (2015) show that Sn can be decomposed as
Sn = Γn
An
E
Bn rn, (2)
where E is the total equity, E =
∑N
n=1En, rn is the n-th element of the vector
r = W ε, i.e. the portfolio return of bank n due to the shock ε, and
Γn =
K∑
k=1
(
N∑
m=1
AmWm,k
)
`kWn,k.
The aggregate vulnerability is computed simply as
AV =
N∑
n=1
Sn. (3)
Finally, the indirect vulnerability of a bank is
IVn = (1 +Bn)
K∑
k=1
`kWn,k
N∑
n′=1
Wn′,k An′ Bn′ rn′ . (4)
In what follows we often assume, as in Duarte and Eisenbach (2013), that k = 1%
for all k = 1, ..., K, which in turns implies that rn = 1% in equations (2) and (4).
Note however that if all the assets are shocked by the same amount, our results
do not depend on it, since the systemic risk measures will have only a different
pre-factor. In Section 4.1.1 we consider other shock scenarios to test the robustness
of our methods. Finally, we set the liquidity parameter at `k = 10
−10 for all asset
classes except for cash, for which we put `k = 0 (as in Greenwood et al., 2015; Duarte
and Eisenbach, 2013). As a final comment it should be noted that (Greenwood
et al., 2015) add two more constraints to the problem. First, when direct losses
of a bank exceed its equity, the bank liquidates all the assets. Second, leverage is
capped to the value 30. In our empirical investigation we have followed (Duarte and
Eisenbach, 2013) who do not add these constraints. We have however compared
the aggregate vulnerability of the US banking system (see next Section for the data
used) under the two model specifications. We have found that the difference is less
than 1% with the exception of few quarters around the end of 2009 when it reaches
10%.
It is important to stress that the Greenwood et al. (2015) method to estimate
systemic risk metrics is essentially static. As it is standard in stress testing, a
given scenario of price changes at a given time is considered and then, given the
balance sheet and portfolio composition of banks at that time, the consequences
of deleveraging and fire sales are computed. Thus no past information (even when
available) on balance sheets or prices is ever used in the methodology. This is of
course a limitation since the decision on how to deleverage in a certain quarter
depends in reality also on past market price behavior as well as on deleveraging
in the last quarters. Such an extension, although interesting, is beyond the scope
of Greenwood et al. (2015) model as well as of the vast majority of stress test
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methods. It would require to choose scenarios containing the price changes at
more than one quarter as well as being able to disentangle the price changes due
to fundamental reasons from those due to past deleveraging. The definition of a
dynamic stress test is clearly beyond the scope of our paper and we will stick to
the standard static stress test approach. As in Duarte and Eisenbach (2013), in the
empirical application below we will consider a stress test for each available quarter,
discarding all the information coming from past quarters. Thus even if apparently
we are treating a time series of portfolios of length T , as a matter of fact we are
repeating T times the (static) stress test.
In the next section we present the dataset that we use in our analysis to measure
systemic risk, as captured by the metrics of Greenwood et al. (2015), in the US
banking sector. Such a dataset allows us to have quarterly estimates of systemicness,
aggregate, and indirect vulnerability and to compare these estimates with those
inferred from the Cross-Entropy approach and the Maximum Entropy principle.
Since we have to deal with both real and reconstructed (or sampled form a statistical
ensemble) networks, from now on we follow the convention to add a superscript x?
to any variable x whenever it is referred to a real (observed) network, while the
variable x is represented without the superscript ? every time it is referred to a
reconstructed network (e.g. one sampled from a statistical ensemble as described
in Section 5).
3 Data
All regulated financial institutions in the United States are required to file peri-
odic financial information with their incumbent regulators. The Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, is the regulatory institution responsible to col-
lect and maintain the data used in our analysis. The financial institutions subject
of our investigation are Commercial Banks and Savings and Loans Associations.
The FFIEC defines officially a commercial bank as8: “[...] a financial institution
that is owned by stockholders, operates for a profit, and engages in various lending
activities”. FFIEC requires commercial banks to file the quarterly Consolidated
Report of Condition and Income, generally referred to as Call Report. Each bank
is required to fill a form with detailed information on its financial status, in par-
ticular on its balance sheet. The specific reporting requirements depend upon the
size of the bank and whether or not it has any foreign office. The form FFIEC031
is used for banks with both domestic (U.S.) and foreign (non-U.S.) offices while
form FFIEC041 is designed for banks with domestic (U.S.) offices only. A Saving
and Loan Association is a financial institution that accepts deposits primarily from
individuals and channels its funds primarily into residential mortgage loans. From
the first quarter of 2012, all Savings and Loan Associations are required to file the
same reports, thus they are included in the dataset since then.
The data provided by the Call reports are publicly available9 since 1986, although
8See http://www.ffiec.gov/nicSearch/FAQ/Glossary.html.
9See https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/
commercial-bank-data.
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Figure 1: We report in the left panel the percentage of total assets detained by top 10,
top 100, top 1000 and the remaining banks in shaded areas of different colors. A vast
portion of total assets is controlled by the top 10 banks. In the right panel we report, for
each quarters, the contribution of the top seven asset classes (in terms of capitalization)
to the total capitalization. A large percentage to total asset capitalization is due to Loan
Secured by Real Estates in Domestic Offices.
the form changed considerably throughout the years, showing an increasing level
of details requested. To have a good compromise between the fine structure of
data and a reasonably populated statistics we considered the time period going
from March 2001 to September 2013, for a total of 55 quarters. The number of
financial institutions present in the data is pretty stable during quarters, starting
from approximately 9, 000 entities in the first quarter and ending in roughly 6, 500 in
the last one. The asset categories have been created as coherent sums of codes. We
describe the procedure adopted to form asset classes in Appendix A along with some
data statistics. In particular, we aggregate data in a set of 20 asset classes following
the rationale of Duarte and Eisenbach (2013), that is each of the 20 asset classes is
composed in such a way that, in case of a fire sale of assets belonging to a specific
class, the price impact would be restricted mainly to the assets in the same class.
In other words, it is reasonable to assume that the co-illiquidity (or cross impact)
of two different asset classes is negligible. The twenty macro asset classes used to
build the network are described in Table 2 of Appendix A, which also documents
in detail how they have been formed. In the left panel of Figure 1 we show how the
total asset value is concentrated on the top tiered banks. The right panel of Figure
1 shows the relative importance of the top seven assets classes (in terms of total
capitalization), revealing that a large portion of the total capitalization is due to
Loan secured by real estates in domestic offices.
To test the role of portfolio similarity in systemic risk, we report in Figure 2 the time
series of the mean similarity between all the pairs of banks’ portfolios. Similarity is
measured with the cosine (or L2) norm i.e. the cosine of the angle formed by the
two vectors {X∗n,k}k=1,..,K and {X∗m,k}k=1,..,K representing the portfolios of bank n
and m, respectively. The plot shows clearly that similarity between portfolios has
increased significantly before the 2008 crisis, making the systemic risk higher. A
pretty similar pattern is shown by the aggregate vulnerability in Figure 5, we will
turn later on this point.
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Figure 2: Mean cosine (or L2) similarity of pairs of portfolios of US commercial banks.
In conclusion, for each quarter we are able to construct a matrix X? of bank holding
whose element X?n,k is the total dollars invested by the n-th bank in the k-th asset
class. It is important to note that the matrix X? has around 50% of zero entries.
Thus the network is relatively dense, but far from being fully connected. Simply
put, the portfolio of the typical bank in the dataset does not contain investments
in all the 20 assets classes.
4 The Cross-Entropy Approach for Systemic Risk
Assessment
Cross-Entropy is a method10, largely adopted by scholars and researchers of central
banks, used to reconstruct a target matrix (as the inter-bank matrix) from partial
knowledge of its properties. The idea is to select an a priori guess for the matrix
and then to find its closest matrix subject to some constraints. In the simplest case,
such constraints are non negativity conditions of matrix elements and the total row
and column sums. Finally, as a measure of distance to be minimized between the
guess and the target matrix one uses the Kullback-Leibler divergence (also called
relative entropy).
For the specific case of the system of bank holdings for US commercial banks we
assume to have at our disposal, for each quarter, only the information on the total
10The method is also known as matrix balancing, or maximum entropy matrix reconstruction.
We refer to it as Cross-Entropy in order to clearly distinguish it from a method deriving proba-
bility distributions over all possible matrices (graphs). The latter is introduced in Section 5 as a
competing approach for systemic risk reconstruction, and we refer to it as Canonical Maximum
Entropy Ensemble method.
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asset size A?n for the n-th bank and the total capitalization C
?
k for the k-th asset
class. The Cross-Entropy approach derives the target matrix X as that which solves
the optimization problem
min
X
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Xn,k log
(
Xn,k
X˜n,k
)
s.t.
N∑
n=1
Xn,k = A
?
n, n = 1, ..., N,
K∑
k=1
Xn,k = C
?
k , k = 1, ..., K,
Xn,k ≥ 0,
(5)
where X˜n,k are the entries of a given guess matrix. Note that the cases analyzed
in the interbank lending literature (Mistrulli, 2011) typically have an additional
constraint that diagonal elements vanish, required to avoid a single institution to
be simultaneously a borrower and lender to itself (see, for example, the Appendix B
in Mistrulli, 2011). The matrix of portfolio holdings analyzed here does not require
any of such kind of restrictions.
We suggest to use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to form an economically
motivated initial guess. In a standard CAPM, investors choose their portfolio in
such a way that each weight on a stock is the fraction of that stock’s market value
relative to the total market value of all stocks (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin,
1966). Since A?n is the total asset size of the n-th bank and since the total market
value of all stocks is given by L? =
∑K
k=1C
?
k , the portfolio weights expected by
CAPM are given by11
XCAPMn,k =
C?k
L∗
A?n. (6)
Notice that this choice of the initial guess is the same used in Mistrulli (2011) for
the interbank market, even if in that case the CAPM interpretation is less direct.
Given that in (5) the condition on the diagonal elements is absent and since the
Kullback-Leibler divergence is always positive, the optimal solution of the Cross-
Entropy problem in (5) when X˜n,k = X
CAPM
n,k is nothing but the X
CAPM
n,k itself. To
distinguish the estimator from the Capital Asset Pricing Model of (Sharpe, 1964)
we will call the former Cross Entropy CAPM (CECAPM) estimator. Note that
thanks to the bipartite nature of the network under study we do not have to resort
to numerical routines to solve problem (5). If other constraints are added to the
problem (e.g. that some banks cannot invest in some asset classes) one could nu-
merically solve the problem (5) with the additional constraints.
11
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Figure 3: This figure reports as a black continuous line the aggregated vulnerability,
as defined by equation (3), computed on the matrix X?n,k of portfolio holdings
as provided by the FFIEC dataset of US commercial bank holdings, described in
Section 3. The dashed red line refers to the aggregate vulnerability reconstructed
with CECAPM.
4.1 Assessing aggregate vulnerability
We now empirically test the validity of the cross entropy approach in estimating
the aggregate vulnerability on our data.
Figure 5 compares the true value of the aggregated vulnerability, obtained by using
the real matrix of portfolio compositions, with the one obtained with the cross
entropy method. It is clear that CECAPM provides estimates of AVs in excellent
agreement with the real one, in spite of the fact that the true portfolio matrix is
quite different from that of CECAPM, because in the former roughly half of the
matrix elements are zero while the latter models have adjacency matrices with all
non vanishing elements.
An important implication of Figure 5 is that, at least for the dataset under analysis,
it is not necessary to know the matrix X? to assess the systemic risk as measured by
the aggregate vulnerability. The knowledge of banks’ size and assets’ capitalization
is enough to infer the matrix XCAPMn,k , which very well reproduces the aggregate
behavior (in terms of systemicness) of the system. This is different from the result
of Mistrulli (2011) for the interbank network, since he finds that the Cross-Entropy
approach significantly underestimates systemic risk, while in our case the bias is
11More precisely, we are deriving what can be addressed as a “banking-CAPM” since, as men-
tioned before, C?k represents the total amount of asset’s k capitalization due to the banking sector
and not its total market capitalization.
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Figure 4: Aggregate vulnerability under different shock scenarios. Each panel re-
ports the AV obtained from the full knowledge of portfolios composition and those
obtained using the CECAPM recontruction.
negligible.
4.1.1 Robustness to different shock scenarios
The estimation and reconstruction of AV has been performed by assuming a uniform
shock of 1% across all asset classes. However our results are robust also to other
shock scenarios. To show this, we have repeated the above analysis by considering
other cases, namely: (i) a 50 % shock on Real Estate loans (2 asset classes); (ii)
a 10 % shock on all loans (8 asset classes); (iii) a 50% shock on Mortgage Backed
Securities (1 asset class); and (iv) a 10% shock on U.S. treasury securities, U.S
agency securities, Securities issued by state and local governments (3 asset classes).
The resulting aggregate vulnerability with real data and estimated with CECAPM
is shown in Figure 4. In all cases the CECAPM estimation tracks quite closely
the AV obtained from the full knowledge of portfolios composition. We therefore
conclude that our result is not due to the uniform shock assumption, but is more
generically applicable.
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4.1.2 European Banking Authority Data
We now show that our results hold also for different banking systems. To this end we
investigate the public dataset made available12 by the European Banking Authority
(EBA), after the 2011 stress tests conducted on the largest 90 European banks at the
time. The data consists of the exposures of each bank toward a set of 42 asset classes,
as well as their book leverages. We defined the asset classes following precisely
Greenwood et al. (2015) 13. Moreover the initial shock is (following Greenwood
et al., 2015) “a 50% write-off of all GIIPS debt”. As for the U.S. commercial banks,
we compared the AV obtained from the full network data with that obtained using
CECAPM. The relative percentage bias of AV estimated using partial information
is 3.7%. As a robustness check, we repeated the exercise for two different shocks:
a 10% write off of either all EU debt or all sovereign debt, including non E.U.
countries. The percentage bias of the CECAPM estimation is 3.6% in the former
case and 5.1% in the latter. Clearly also for this dataset, CECAPM gives a faithful
estimation of AV, since the bias is around 3%− 5%, showing the robustness of the
method.
4.2 Assessing systemic risk for individual banks
We now test the performance of CECAPM in assessing systemic risk for individual
banks. In order to assess the performance of an estimator that produces estimates
Ŝn and ÎVn of, respectively, systemicness and indirect vulnerability of the n-th bank
in a given quarter we compute the relative error as
sn =
Ŝn − S?n
S?n
, vn =
ÎVn − IV?n
IV?n
. (7)
In each quarter we have from N = 6, 500 to N = 9, 000 values of relative errors
for each metric. We find that the median of the distribution of relative errors for
both metrics is quite constant and fluctuates around ÷− 12%, while the interquan-
tile range is between −20% and 15% (see the figure in Appendix C). Thus Cross
Entropy tends to slightly underestimate single banks measures of systemic risk.
In summary, the estimates of systemicness and indirect vulnerably for each single
bank as provided by the CECAPM-implied matrix are satisfactorily accurate. Once
more, the important message is that it is possible to achieve pretty accurate esti-
mates of systemic risk metrics, at the aggregate or individual institution level, due
to fire sales spillover without a full knowledge of the portfolio holdings of financial
institutions.
12 http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2011/
results
13The asset classes are: “sovereign debt of each of the 27 EU countries plus 10 others, commercial
real estate, mortgages, corporate loans, small and medium enterprise loans, and retail revolving
credit lines.”
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5 Comparison with the Max-Entropy ensembles
The Cross-Entropy approach described in the previous section assumes that the
unknown matrix elements are those with minimal distance (as proxied by the cross-
entropy function) from an a priori matrix. In this approach, the available economic
information, which, in the specific case described above, consists of the quantities
A?n and C
?
k , is used to construct the guess following an economic intuition.
A different rationale constitutes the foundation of the Maximum-Entropy (ME) en-
sembles approach. This reconstruction method assumes, as standard in contexts of
partial information, that the undisclosed quantities (in our case, the banks’ portfolio
holdings Xn,k) are random variables generated from an unknown statistical distri-
bution. The ME approach amounts to take, among all the possible probability
distributions, the one which maximizes the informational content of the economic
constraints imposed during the maximization. This property follows directly from
the definition of information as stated in the seminal paper by Shannon (1948).
We define14 a network statistical model as a set X of graphs, called ensemble, and
a probability mass function Pϑ indexed by a vector of model parameters ϑ. In
formula it is expressed as the triplet
{ Pϑ,X ,ϑ ∈ Ξ } ,
where Ξ is a convex subset of RP , with P the total number of parameters of the
model. The set X is a countable set whose elements are graphs. In what follows, we
will not distinguish between the graph and the associated matrix X, i.e. the prob-
ability mass function is defined in the space of integer valued matrices. Moreover
the probability mass function Pϑ : X → [0, 1] is such that
∑
X∈X Pϑ (X) = 1 and is
allowed to depend on a vector of real parameters ϑ ∈ Ξ. A model can be defined by
explicitly giving the ensemble, the probability mass function along with the space Ξ
of the parameters, or by deriving Pϑ [X] through the recurrent application of some
generative mechanism or rule, either starting from an empty graph or by applying
a randomization procedure to a reference graph.
In its most general formulation, the ME principle postulates to obtain the proba-
bility mass function P as that which maximizes the Shannon’s entropy
S = −
∑
X∈X
P [X] log (P [X])
subject to the normalization constraint∑
X∈X
P [X] = 1,
and, possibly, to further additional constraints.
There are two ways of imposing the constraints. In the first one, termed micro-
canonical ensemble, constraints are imposed exactly, i.e. only the graphs fulfilling
14In describing our ME approach, we largely follow the theoretical framework of Kolaczyk
(2009).
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all the constraints have non zero probability. In the second one, termed canonical
ensemble, all the graphs have non zero probability and the constraints are satis-
fied on average over the distribution. There are advantages and disadvantages in
both approaches. The microcanonical ensemble is economically more grounded, for
example in the system under investigation here it implies that a given network re-
alization has non zero probability only if each bank (asset class) has the same asset
size (capitalization) as in real data. On the contrary, in the canonical ensemble also
graphs where these values are very different from the real data might have non zero
probability. Despite this undesirable property, we believe it is worth performing a
comparison of the Cross-Entropy approach with the canonical ME for the following
reasons:
1. Solving the problem in the microcanonical ensemble is typically extremely
hard or it requires extensive numerical simulations, randomizing the network
by allowing moves that preserve all the constraints. On the contrary, canon-
ical ensemble can often be obtained much more directly, as testified by their
widespread use in Statistical Mechanics (Huang, 2008). Moreover when other
constraints are added to the optimization problem, microcanonical ME (as
well as Cross-Entropy) becomes intractable, thus limiting their practical use
when regulators want to add additional knowledge on the system.
2. The flexibility of canonical ME allows exploring the relative role of information
set and constraints in network reconstruction. For example we will show below
that, using the same information sets (the strength sequences) but different
constraints can lead to very different performance in the estimation of systemic
risk, indicating its main determinants.
3. The excellent performance of CECAPM for systemic risk assessment calls
for the construction of a network probability distribution which performs on
average as CECAPM, but allows for scenario generation. The canonical ME
ensemble we will introduce below (MECAPM) does exactly this job.
4. Last but not least, the application of canonical ME network ensembles in
Economics and Finance is quite widespread, see, for example, Bargigli and
Gallegati (2011); Squartini et al. (2011); Fagiolo et al. (2013); Mastrandrea
et al. (2014); Saracco et al. (2015); Almog et al. (2017)
5.1 Maximum Entropy ensembles
We will consider three ME ensembles in this paper15. First, we propose a new max
entropy ensemble which is based on the role of CAPM in the problem at hand. The
probability mass function P is the solution of the optimization problem
15All numerical routines, accompanied with an instruction manual, can be downloaded from
http://mathfinance.sns.it/network_reconstruction/
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max
P
−
∑
X∈X
P [X] log (P [X])
s.t.
∑
X∈X
P [X] = 1
EX [Xn,k] = XCAPMn,k , n = 1, ..., N, k = 1, ..., K.
(8)
We call this model Maximum Entropy Capital Asset Pricing Model (shortened in
MECAPM henceforth). In Appendix B.1 we prove that the MECAPM has the
unique solution
P [X] =
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
(
XCAPMn,k
1 +XCAPMn,k
)Xn,k
1
1 +XCAPMn,k
, (9)
hence each single matrix entry Xn,k is geometrically distributed with mean X
CAPM
n,k .
To understand the rationale behind this ensemble, we notice an interesting relation
between the CECAPM and MECAPM estimation of AV under a uniform shock of
asset returns. As shown in Appendix D,
E [Sn (X)] = Sn
(
XCAPM
)(
1 +
A∗n
L∗
+
∑K
k=2Ck∑K
k=2C
?2
k
)
, (10)
where E [Sn (X)] is the expected systemicness of bank n under the MECAPM en-
semble and Sn
(
XCAPM
)
is the one according to the CECAPM. We notice that the
former is larger than the latter, but the correction is small if A∗n  L∗, since the
last term in parenthesis is generally small. This result can also be used to compute
systemicness and AV in the MECAPM ensemble without sampling but using the
expression above. A similar result holds for indirect vulnerability (see Appendix D
for details).
Since the other specifications of maximum entropy are quite popular in the literature
of network reconstruction, for comparison purposes we take into considerations two
other ensembles, mainly inspired by the paper by Mastrandrea et al. (2014) and
Saracco et al. (2015). Each of them is characterized by different constraints imposed
on the maximization of the Shannon’s entropy.
In the first ensemble, termed Bipartite Weighted Configuration Model (BIPWCM),
the constrained maximization is
max
P
−
∑
X∈X
P [X] log (P [X])
s.t.
∑
X∈X
P [X] = 1
EX [An] = A?n, n = 1, ..., N,
EX [Ck] = C?k , k = 1, ..., K.
Appendix B.2 reports the derivation and calibration of the ensemble. Note that
BIPWCM imposes weaker constraints with respect to MECAPM, while exploiting
17
the same information set, namely the strength sequences.
Finally, we consider another (richer) statistical ensemble whose probability mass
function, derived in Appendix B.3, corresponds in our bipartite framework to the
enhanced configuration model of Mastrandrea et al. (2014). This newly defined
ensemble, that we address as Bipartite Enhanced Configuration Model (BIPECM),
is obtained via Maximum Entropy imposing both the mean value of strengths (as
in BIPWCM) and the mean value of degrees, that is the number of edges incident
in each vertex. In other words, we reconstruct the matrix by assuming the knowl-
edge of the number of assets in which each bank invests as well as the number of
banks investing in each asset. Despite the fact that this information is typically
not known, we consider this ensemble to show that even with an information set
significantly larger than the one used in MECAPM it is very difficult to outperform
it. Mathematically, the BIPECM is obtained by solving the optimization problem
max
P
−
∑
X∈X
P [X] log (P [X])
s.t.
∑
X∈X
P [X] = 1
EX [An] = A?n,
EX [Drown ] = Drow
?
n , n = 1, ..., N,
EX [Ck] = C?k ,
EX
[
Dcolk
]
= Dcol
?
k , k = 1, ..., K,
(11)
where Drown and D
col
k are, respectively, the row and the column degree sequences
(see Appendix B.3 for more details). The peculiarity of BIPECM is the addition
of the information on the degree sequences that is absent in both BIPWCM and
MECAPM16. Note that the three ensembles can be used not only for statistical
inferences, but to produce estimates of any function defined on the network, which
is the topic of the next section.
5.2 Results
Figure 5 compares the true value of the aggregated vulnerability, obtained by using
the real matrix of portfolio compositions, with those obtained with entropic meth-
ods. It is clear that all the methods track qualitatively well the temporal pattern
of AV in the investigated period, but it is worth noticing that CECAPM has a very
tiny bias, providing estimates of AVs in excellent agreement with the real one. As
expected from the above argument, AV under MECAPM is always slightly larger
than under CECAPM. Among the max entropy methods, MECAPM outperforms
16One could consider another maximum entropy ensemble where the constraints are the same
as in MECAPM plus the degree sequences. This is an enhanced MECAPM because additional
information on the number of asset classes in each portfolio (and the number of banks investing
in each asset class) is used. The optimization can be performed but the application on the US
banks data shows no appreciable improvement in the systemic risk assessment with respect to the
CECAPM (data available on request). For this reason and for the sake of simplicity in this paper
we will not present results on this ensemble.
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Figure 5: This figure reports as a black continuous line the aggregated vulnerability,
as defined by equation (3), computed on the matrix X?n,k of portfolio holdings
as provided by the FFIEC dataset of US commercial bank holdings, described in
Section 3. The other lines refer to the aggregate vulnerability reconstructed with
the four entropic methods.
BIPWCM and BIPECM. Since the information set required to derive the BIPECM
is larger than that used for the MECAPM, this means that it is not the amount
of information that matters, rather the way in which information is conveyed in
the reconstruction algorithm. Finally, notice that the true portfolio matrix is quite
different from the matrices of CECAPM, MECAPM, and BIPWCM because in the
former half of the matrix elements are zero while the latter models have adjacency
matrices with all non vanishing elements.
A similar comparative result holds by considering different shock scenario, as those
studied in Section 4 (see Fig. 8 of the Appendix C) as well as for the European
Banking Authority Data (see Table 1. Among the max entropy methods, MECAPM
significantly outperforms BIPWCM and BIPECM in estimating the AV obtained
with the full knowledge of the portfolio composition of banks.
Finally we considered the assessment of systemic risk for individual banks. Figure 9
of the Appendix C shows that for each quarter BIPWCM strongly underestimates
individual bank systemicness and indirect vulnerability. The median relative error
ranges roughly between −60% and −70% and the interquartile range is very far
from zero. The estimator based on BIPECM (using the additional information
on degrees) gives slightly better results, even if a strong underestimation is still
present. The median relative error ranges roughly between −50% and −40% and
again the interquartile range is far from zero. On the contrary the estimator based
on MECAPM (or CECAPM) performs much better. The median relative error
19
50% GIIPS 10% E.U. Gov. 10% All Gov.
AV = 496.3% AV = 270.8% AV = 357%
ÂV % Bias % Bias % Bias
CECAPM 480.4 % 3.2% 3.6 % 5.1 %
BIPWCM 361.9% 27.1 % 28.6 % 22.4 %
BIPECM 392.9 % 20.8% 20.6 % 12.5 %
MECAPM 436.7 % 12% 12.4 % 4.1 %
Table 1: Comparison, for the EBA data, between real and estimated values of the
Aggregate Vulnerability (AV ). The three columns correspond to different shocks.
Under the name of each shock we report the corresponding real AV , computed
from the complete knowledge of banks’ portfolios. In the first column we report the
estimated AV and the percentage bias for the 4 different ensembles, resulting from
a 50% value loss of GIIPS sovereign debt, as considered in Greenwood et al. (2015).
In the second and third columns we report the percentage biases of estimated AV
for two alternative scenarios: a 10% loss of value for either all the E.U. sovereign
debt or the sovereign debt of all countries.
never goes below−20% and almost always the interquartile range is centered around
zero.17
In summary, the estimates of systemicness and indirect vulnerably for each single
bank as provided by the CECAPM-implied matrix are almost identical to those
obtained as the corresponding expected values on the MECAPM ensemble. Besides,
they are satisfactorily accurate and surely more reliable than those provided by
standard maximum entropy ensembles. Once more, the important message is that
it is possible to achieve pretty accurate estimates of systemic risk metrics, at the
aggregate or individual institution level, due to fire sales spillover without a full
knowledge of the portfolio holdings of financial institutions.
5.3 Monitoring and testing changes in systemicness
As another application of the ensembles of graphs obtained with the Maximum En-
tropy method, we consider here the problem of assessing whether the systemicness
of a given bank (or of the whole system) has changed in a statistically significant
way. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to have a null hypothesis
and we propose to use network ensembles to this end. Since the MECAPM shows
superior performances in estimating risk metrics, in this section we use it and we
propose a possible application for statistical validation. Our objective here is not to
study all the banks and all the quarters, but only to show how the testing method
17If instead we focus on the banks with higher systemicness or indirect vulnerability, the perfor-
mances of the estimator based on MECAPM worsen. In particular, for the quartile of banks with
largest systemicness, the median percentage bias of the MECAPM estimator of systemicness is
always between −20% and −30%. Similarly, the median of the percentage bias in the estimation
of indirect vulnerability via MECAPM is always between −20% and −35%. Nevertheless, the
ranking among the three estimation methods remains unchanged.
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can be implemented.
In particular, imagine a regulator who monitors a given bank, measuring its sys-
temicness and searching for evidences of a significant increase. Having a given
quarter as reference, the regulator can extract the distribution of bank’s systemic-
ness and, in the subsequent quarters, identify when the systemicness is outside a
given confidence interval around the reference period. As a special case, we select
four banks among the top fifty in the first quarter and that exist for the entire time
period (i.e. they do not exit the dataset). For each quarter we compute the true
bank systemicness and the 5%-95% confidence bands according to the MECAPM
ensemble (see Figure 6). We then added a magenta square in each quarter when
the true systemicness is above the 95% confidence band of the first quarter, used as
reference. Hence, a magenta square is indicating a quarter when the systemicness
of the bank is statistically larger (according to the MECAPM) than at beginning of
2001. We show two banks for which a statistically significant change in systemic-
ness is observed (top row) and two for which no change is observed (bottom row).
Notably, for the former case we find that the systemicness of the banks analyzed
increased significantly much before the onset of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This
phenomenon persisted along the entire period of the crisis and vanished not before
the end of 2009. This suggests that network statistical models could be of valuable
help in the surveillance activity of central banks and other supervisory authorities
as monitoring tools and in constructing early warning indicators.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we focused on the problem of estimating metrics of systemic risk
due to fire sale spillover in presence of limited information on the composition of
portfolios of financial institutions. A full knowledge of the portfolio holdings of each
institution in the economy is generally required to have a precise estimate of any
risk metrics that, as those proposed by Greenwood et al. (2015), is based on the
mechanism of portfolio rebalancing through fire sales. Nevertheless, such a huge
and detailed information may not be available, especially at frequency higher than
quarterly, making the estimation of systemic risk quite difficult. In this paper we
circumvent the problem by providing accurate estimates of systemic risk metrics
that are based on a partial knowledge of the system, more precisely only on the
sizes of balance sheets and the capitalization of assets (or asset classes), which are
much easier to trace. In this respect, we have shown that the method of Cross-
Entropy minimization does a very good job in estimating aggregate vulnerability
and individual bank systemicness without requiring any knowledge of the underlying
matrix of bank portfolio holdings.
Furthermore, we have compared the results with a Max Entropy ensembles. Specif-
ically we have introduced a new ensemble (MECAPM), which reproduces, on av-
erage, the CECAPM and performs quite well in estimating systemicness and in-
direct vulnerability of single institutions, outperforming standard Max Entropy
competitors. Moreover the estimation of systemic risk metrics could provide valu-
able information to any policy maker, but variations in systemicness and indirect
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Figure 6: We report, for four selected banks, the true systemicness (thick dotted
lines) and the 5%-95% confidence bands according to the MECAPM ensemble. A
magenta square is added in every quarter in which the systemicness of the bank is
above the 95% confidence level of the first quarter of 2001.
vulnerability are difficult to interpret in absence of a statistical validation. For this
reason, as a final contribution, we have proposed to use the Max Entropy ensemble
to assess the statistical significance of systemic risk metrics. On a selection of banks
of our dataset we documented that their systemicness significantly increased, with
respect to the level observed at the beginning of the 2001, much before the onset
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Even if deeper investigations are required in this
direction, we believe that this approach could be easily implemented as an early
warning indicator of systemic risk.
Finally, we would like to comment again on the scope of the Greenwood et al.
(2015) model as well of our paper. As discussed in the main text, the considered
methodology belongs to the classic static stress test approach. Only the portfolios
and balance sheets at the time of the tested shock are used and no intertemporal
dynamics is ever considered. This is a serious limitation, since financial distress
and deleveraging might occur on longer periods and the bank’s decision at a given
quarter can depend, not only on the present price changes and portfolio composition,
but also on past market state and banks’ behavior. We believe that extending
the Greenwood et al. (2015) approach to a dynamic stress test setting is a very
interesting avenue for research both for academicians and for regulators.
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A Data Description and Dataset Creation
This appendix provides some descriptive features of the data along with the method
adopted to build the 20 asset classes of the bank-asset network analyzed in the
paper. The left panel (first row) of Figure 7 reports, on a log-log scale, the kernel
density of the bank sizes (i.e. the total amount of assets detained by the bank)
pooled across all quarters. It is evident that bank sizes are quite heterogeneous.
The right panel (first row) of Figure 7 reports the density of the bank leverages
Bn pooled across all quarters. In this case we observe a much less heterogeneous
distribution, with most banks showing a leverage around 10. Finally, the second row
of Figure 7 reports the relation between size and leverage. The plot is achieved by
sorting all records of bank size from the smallest to the largest and then applying a
moving-window procedure. As expected from the density plots, there is no relation
between leverage and bank size, having most bank a leverage of 10 and a highly
heterogeneous size.
Concerning the formation of the asset classes used in the main text, we provide in
what follows details on how they have been created. As mentioned in the main text,
the focus of the paper is on commercial banks, whose precise definition is given by
the FFIEC as [...] every national bank, state member bank, insured state nonmember
bank, and savings association is required to file a consolidated Call Report normally
as of the close of business on the last calendar day of each calendar quarter, i.e.,
the report date. The specific reporting requirements depend upon the size of the bank
and whether it has any “foreign” offices [...]. This is the set of institutions that is
referred as Commercial Banks throughout all the paper.
Forms FFIEC031 and FFIEC041 are dedicated to, respectively, banks with only do-
mestic offices and banks with domestic and foreign offices. However, in both forms,
it is adopted the same coding system. More specifically there are only two types
of codes, RCON and RCFD, which are followed by a four digits alphanumerical
code. The alphanumerical code identifies the budget item, for example 2170 refers
to total assets of the bank. The prefix RCON is used for financial items relative to
domestic offices, while RCFD encompasses both domestic and foreign offices. Hence
RCON2170 is the code for the total assets of the bank detained in U.S. offices, while
RCFD2170 is relative to the sum of total assets detained in U.S. plus offices abroad.
Of course, for banks that fill the FFIEC031 the two codes RCON and RCFD report
the same value if they have the same alphanumerical code.
Table 2 documents the detailed composition of each asset class. For each asset class
(first column) we report the composition in terms of FFEIC items in the third col-
umn and a short name given to the asset class in the second one. Such abbreviation
is needed since some asset class, e.g. “loans to consumers in foreign offices”, are
assembled subtracting from the FFIEC codes some previously defined asset classes.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between asset classes and variable names, a
part for the case of “loans secured by real estates in domestic offices”, which is
computed as the sum of five variables, from “construction loans” to “non farm, non
residential”. The composition of the FFEIC formula reported in the third column
may vary during time, hence we report in bold the period of validity of the formula
adopted. In this respect, note that the date 12/99 refers to the last available quar-
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ter, that is the third quarter of 2014. In reporting the FFEIC formula, we adopt
the convention that the prefix is omitted whenever RCON is used solely for banks
with only domestic offices and RCFD solely for those that have at least on office
abroad. On the contrary, when the prefix is specified, it means that only the code
with that particular prefix is being been used. For example the code RCON3532 is
used only in its domestic version, hence we do not use RCFD3532 for banks with
offices abroad.
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Figure 7: This Figure reports some descriptive features of the data analyzed. Top left panel plots, on a
log-log scale, the kernel density of bank sizes (defined as total assets in unit of 103$) while top right is
the kernel density of the bank leverages. Both densities are computed using all records pooled across the
entire time span. For the sake of visualization, we put a cut-off of 50 on the maximum leverage allowed,
although leverages of more than 150 are (rarely) observed. The bottom panel shows that there is no relation
between leverage and size. The procedure adopted to draw the plot is the following: all records of bank
size are sorted from the smallest to the largest one and a rolling window of 1000 records is moved, with an
incremental shift of 10 records, from the first to the last. In each window we compute the mean leverage
(black continuous line) and the standard deviation of leverage (red dotted line) of banks that fall in the
window. Mean and standard deviation are plotted as a function of the mean size in the window, which is
reported in the horizontal axis.
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Table 2: Composition of Asset Classes
Asset Class Variable Name FFIEC Formula
Total assets tot ass 03/01-12/99: 2170+2123+3123
Equity equity
03/01-03/09: 3210+3000
03/09-12/99: G105
Cash and balances due from depository institu-
tions
cahab 03/01-12/99: 0081+0071
U.S. treasury securities ust sec 03/01-12/99: 0211+1287+RCON3531
U.S agency securities agency sec 03/11-12/99: 1289+1294+1293+1298+RCON3532
Securities issued by state and local governments state sec 03/01-12/99: 8496+8499+RCON3533
Mortgage backed securities mbs 03/01-03/09: 1698+1702+1703+1707+1709+1713+1714+1717+1718+1732+
1733+1736+RCON3534+RCON3535+RCON3536.
06/09-12/10: G300+G303+G304+G307+G308+G311+G312+G315+G316+
G319+G320+G323+G324+G327+G328+G331+RCONG379+RCONG380+
RCONG381+RCONG382
03/11-12/99: G300+G303+G304+G307+G308+G311+G312+G315+G316+
G319+G320+G323+K142+K146+K145+
K149+K150+K154+K153+K157+
RCONG379+RCONG380+RCONG381+RCONK197+RCONK198
Asset backed securities abs 03/01-12/05: B838+B841+B842+B845+B846+B849+B850+B853+B854+
B857+B858+B861
03/06-03/09 C026+C027
06/09-12/99:
C026+C027+G336+G340+G344+G339+G343+G347
Other domestic debt securities dom debt oth sec 03/01-12/99: 1737+1741
Foreign debt securities for debt sec 03/01-12/99: 1742+1746
Residual securities res sec 03/01-12/99: A511
Futures, forwards sold and securities purchased
under the agreement to resell (asset)
ffrepo ass
03/01-12/01: 1350
03/02-12/99: RCONB987+B989
Loans secured by real estates in domestic offices
Construction loans
03/01-12/07: RCON1415
03/08-12/99: RCONF158+RCONF159
Secured by farmland 03/01-12/99: RCON1420
1-4 Family real estate 03/01-12/99: RCON5367+RCON5368+RCON1797
Multifamily property loans 03/01-12/99: RCON1460
Non farm, non residential
03/01-12/07: RCON1480
03/08-12/99: RCONF160+RCONF161
Loans secured by real estate in foreign offices ln re for
03/01-12/99: (if present) RCFD1410 - ln const -
ln farm - ln rre - ln multi - ln nfnr,
3/01-12/99: (otherwise) zero
Commercial and industrial loans in domestic of-
fices
ln ci dom 03/01-12/99: RCON1766
Commercial and industrial loans in foreign offices ln ci for 03/01-12/99: (if present) RFCD1763+RFCD1764 - RCON1766,
03/01-12/99: (otherwise) zero
Loans to consumers in domestic offices ln cons dom 03/01-12/10: RCON2011+RCONB538+RCONB539
03/11-12/99: +RCONB538+RCONB539+RCONK137+RCONK207
Loans to consumers in foreign offices ln cons for 03/01-12/10: (if present) RCFD2011+ RCFDB538+
RCFDB539 - ln cons dom, (otherwise) zero
03/11-12/99 (if present) RCFDB538+RCFDB539+
RCFDK137+RCFDK207-ln cons dom, (otherwise) zero
Loans to depository institutions and acceptances
of other banks
ln dep inst banks 03/01-12/99: (if present) RCFDB532+RCFDB533+RCFDB534+
RCFDB536+RCFDB537, (otherwise) RCON1288
other loans oth loans 03/01-12/99: 2122+2123-ln const-ln farm-ln rre-ln multi-ln nfnr-
ln re for-ln ci dom-ln ci for-ln cons dom-ln cons for-ln dep inst banks
Equity securities that do not have readily deter-
minable fair value
equ sec nondet 03/01-12/99: 1752
other assets oth ass 03/01-12/99: tot ass - all preceding assets
B Max Entropy Ensembles
In this appendix we provide the details of the derivation of the probability mass
functions for the MECAPM, BIPWCM and BIPECM ensembles. In what follows
we indicate with S (P) [X] the entropy function
S (P [X]) = −
∑
X∈X
P [X] log (P [X]) ,
and with φi (X), i = 1, ..., I, a set of functions of the adjacency matrix, that describe
the economic information available and that, in the constrained maximization, are
required to have fixed expected values φ?i . Examples of φi (X) are φnk = Xnk
and φn =
∑
kXnk or φk =
∑
nXnk. The ME approach consists in defining the
probability mass function which solves the constrained optimization problem
max
P(X)
S (P [X])
s.t.
∑
X∈X
P (X) = 1,
EX [φi] = φ?i , i = 1, ..., I.
(12)
If each matrix element can take only a finite set of values, i.e. the space X is
finite, the optimization problem is easily solved, at least formally, using Lagrange
multipliers. The Lagrangian associated to the problem is written as
L = S (P [X]) + α
(
1−
∑
X∈X
P (X)
)
+
I∑
i=1
ϑi
(
φ?i −
∑
X∈X
P (X)φi (X)
)
,
where α and ϑi are Lagrange multipliers. Taking the first derivative w.r.t. P (x) ≡
P (X = x), where x indicates an element of X , we get18
∂L
∂P (x)
= − log(P (x))− 1− α−
I∑
i=1
ϑi φi = 0,
whose solution is
Pϑ (X) =
e−
∑I
i=1 ϑiφi(X)
Zϑ
, (13)
where ϑ indicates the set of all Lagrange multipliers, and Zϑ is a normalizing factor
given by
Zϑ =
∑
X∈X
e−
∑I
i=1 ϑiφi(X). (14)
Given a set of constraints φ?i the corresponding Lagrange multipliers ϑ
? are obtained
as the (unique19) solution to∑
X∈X
Pϑ? (X)φi (X) = φ?i , i = 1, ..., I.
18We stress that we are considering the derivative w.r.t. the probability of each of the (finite)
possible realizations of X ∈ X .
19The uniqueness of the solution is well-known in maximum entropy literature.
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The latter parameters are determined, either analytically or numerically, from the
economic information codified in the values φ?i . In the text and in the rest of this
Appendix, we omit the dependency of P on ϑ.
Following the literature cited in Section 5, we consider models that allow Xnk to
assume any positive integer values20, in which case the Lagrange multipliers deriva-
tion of the probability mass function is only heuristic. Nevertheless, it is well known
(see for example Campbell, 1970; Barndorff-Nielsen, 2014) that, even in the infi-
nite case, the maximum entropy probability mass function is the one in (13) . In
fact, it can be easily shown that every other probability mass function, satisfying
the constraints in (12), has lower entropy than the one obtained with Lagrange
multipliers.
B.1 Maximum Entropy Capital Asset Pricing Model
Considering the maximum entropy optimization problem with constraint functions
φnk = Xnk, and λn,k as Lagrange multipliers, we obtain the normalizing factor
Zϑ =
∑
X∈X
e−
∑N
n=1
∑K
k=1 λn,kXn,k
=
∑
X∈X
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
e−λn,kXn,k
=
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
∞∑
Xn,k=0
e−λn,kX
=
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
1
1− e−λn,k . (15)
Hence
P (X) =
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
e−λn,kXn,k
1− e−λn,k .
Note that the partition function Zϑ in (15) is such that
∂ log (Zϑ)
∂λn,k
= −EX [Xn,k] . (16)
Hence, imposing the CAPM structure as required in (8), the Lagrange multipliers
are determined by
−∂ logZϑ
∂λn,k
=
A?nC
?
k
L?
,
which gives the probability mass function for the MECAPM
P =
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
(
XCAPMn,k
1 +XCAPMn,k
)Xn,k (
1
1 +XCAPMn,k
)
, (17)
20In considering this case we follow the standard approach in the literature. Requiring addi-
tional constraints on the set of values that each Xnk can assume, would complicate the analytical
computations that follow in this appendix, and result in more involved numerical estimation of
the model.
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where
XCAPMn,k =
A?nC
?
k
L?
.
B.2 Bipartite Weighted Configuration Model.
When we want to use as economic information the total asset size of each bank and
the total capitalization of each asset, without imposing the MECAPM structure,
we need one Lagrange multiplier λn for each φn =
∑
kXnk, and one Lagrange
multiplier ηk for each φk =
∑
nXnk. We can go on with computation by explicitly
writing the expression of An (X) and Ck (X) in terms of the elements of the matrix
X, obtaining
Zϑ =
∑
X∈X
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
e−Xn,k (λn+ηk)
=
∞∑
X1,1=0
· · ·
∞∑
X1,K=0
· · ·
∞∑
Xn,1=0
· · ·
∞∑
Xn,K=0
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
e−Xn,k (λn+ηk)
=
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
∞∑
Xn,k=0
e−Xn,k (λn+ηk)
=
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
1
1− e−(λn+ηk) =
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
1
1− ϕn ξk ,
where ϕn = e
−λn and ξk = e−ηk , whence
P (X) =
∏N
n=1
∏K
k=1 e
−Xn,k (λn+ηk)∏N
n=1
∏K
k=1
1
1−ϕn ξk
=
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
(ϕn ξk)
Xn,k (1− ϕn ξk) , (18)
The value of the Lagrange multipliers are determined by imposing that the expected
value of An (X) and Ck (X) on the ensemble X are equal to, respectively, A?n and
C?k . As for the MECAPM case, note that Zϑ is such that
EX [An] = −∂ log (Zϑ)
∂λn
,
and similarly
EX [Ck] = −∂ log (Zϑ)
∂ηk
.
Hence we can compute EX [An] and EX [Ck] explicitly as a function of the Lagrange
multipliers, that is
EX [An] =
∂
∂λn
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
log
(
1− e−(λn+ηk))
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=
K∑
k=1
e−(λn+ηk)
1− e−(λn+ηk) ,
EX [Ck] =
∂
∂ηk
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
log
(
1− e−(λn+ηk))
=
N∑
n=1
e−(λn+ηk)
1− e−(λn+ηk) .
Therefore the Lagrange multipliers are determined by numerically solving the non-
linear system of equations
∑K
k=1
ϕn ξk
1−ϕn ξk = A
?
n, n = 1, ..., n,∑N
n=1
ϕn ξk
1−ϕn ξk = C
?
k , k = 1, ..., K.
(19)
B.3 Bipartite Enhanced Configuration Model.
The only difference with the Weighted model described in Appendix B.2 is the ad-
dition of the constraints on the number of degrees for each node. Before proceeding,
we have thus to add some additional definitions.
The binary projection of Xn,k is defined as the matrix Yn,k = 1Xn,k>0. Accordingly,
the number Drown of assets in which the n-th bank invests and the number D
col
k of
banks that own the k-th asset class are computed as
Drown (X) =
K∑
k=1
Yn,k, D
col
k (X) =
N∑
n=1
Yn,k, (20)
where the capital letter D stands for degree, as it is common practice in network
theory21.
The maximization problem for the BIPECM case is hence stated as
max
P
S (P [X])
s.t.
∑
X∈X
P [X] = 1
EX [An] = A?n, n = 1, ..., N,
EX [Drown ] = Drow
?
n , n = 1, ..., N,
EX [Ck] = C?k , k = 1, ..., K,
EX
[
Dcolk
]
= Dcol
?
k , k = 1, ..., K.
21We have chosen not to use a different notation for bank and asset degrees since, although they
have an immediate economic interpretation, they are not frequently used in economic analysis.
In fact, while An and Ck are typically publicly available, the degree sequences D
row
n and D
col
k are
instead difficult to trace.
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With an obvious extension of the number of Lagrange multipliers, and sinceDrown (X) =∑K
k=1 1Xn,k>0 (similarly, D
col
k (X) =
∑N
n=1 1Xn,k>0), we obtain
Zϑ =
∑
X∈X
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
e−(Xn,k (λn+ηk)+1Xn,k>0 (ρn+δk))
=
∞∑
X1,1=0
· · ·
∞∑
X1,K=0
· · ·
∞∑
Xn,1=0
· · ·
∞∑
Xn,K=0
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
e−(Xn,k (λn+ηk)+1Xn,k>0 (ρn+δk))
=
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
∞∑
Xn,k=0
e−(Xn,k (λn+ηk)+1Xn,k>0 (ρn+δk))
=
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
1 + e−(ρn+δk) ∞∑
Xn,k=1
e−(Xn,k (λn+ηk))

=
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
(
1 +
e−(ρn+δk)
1− e−(λn+ηk) − e
−(ρn+δk)
)
.
Defining ϕn = e
−λn , ξk = e−ηk , ψn = e−ρn and γk = e−δk we get
Zϑ =
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
1− ϕn ξk (1− ψn γk)
1− ϕn ξk . (21)
Finally, we get that the probability mass function for the BIPECM is
Pϑ (X) =
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
(1− ϕn ξk) (ϕn ξk)Xn,k (ψn γk)1Xn,k>0
1− ϕn ξk (1− ψn γk) . (22)
The determination of the Lagrange multipliers follows a procedure identical to that
described for BIPWCM in Appendix B.2, that is the expected values of An (X),
Ck (X), D
row
n (X) and D
col
k (X) are computed as the partial derivative of − log (Zϑ)
with respect to the corresponding Lagrange multiplier and then equated to the
observed value. This procedure produce the non-linear system of equations
∑K
k=1
φn ξk ψn γk
(1−φn ξk) (1−φn ξk (1−ψn γk)) = A
?
n, n = 1, ..., n,∑K
k=1
φn ξk ψn γk
1−φn ξk (1−ψn γk) = D
row?
n , n = 1, ..., n,∑N
n=1
φn ξk ψn γk
(1−φn ξk) (1−φn ξk (1−ψn γk)) = C
?
k , k = 1, ..., K,∑N
n=1
φn ξk ψn γk
1−φn ξk (1−ψn γk) = D
col?
k , k = 1, ..., K.
(23)
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Figure 8: Aggregate vulnerability under different shock scenarios. Each panel re-
ports the AV obtained from the full knowledge of portfolios composition and those
obtained using the four reconstruction methods considered.
C Comparison of Reconstruction Methods under
Different Shocks
In this appendix we report additional comparisons between cross entropy and max-
imum entropy ensemble methods for systemic risk assessment. In Figure 8 we show
the performances of the four methods presented in the paper in reconstructing Ag-
gregate Vulnerability, for four different shock scenarios. In all cases the CECAPM
and MECAPM estimation outperform the other two and track quite closely the AV
obtained from the full knowledge of portfolios composition. We therefore conclude
that our result is not due to the uniform shock assumption, but is more generically
applicable.
We then compare the performances of the different methods in assessing individual
bank’s quantities, it Indirect Vulnerability and Systemicness. In each quarter we
have from N = 6, 500 to N = 9, 000 values of relative errors for each metric. To
visualize the result we plot the median of the relative error and as a measure of
dispersion we use the interquartile range, i.e. the difference between the upper and
lower quartiles22. Clearly a median well centered around zero is an indication that
the estimator is unbiased.
22We choose these metrics because they are more robust and less sensitive to outliers.
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Figure 9: Time series of the relative error (see Eq. 7) of bank systemicness (top panel)
and indirect vulnerability (bottom panel) with respect to real data as estimated by the
three ensembles BIPWCM (red and squares), BIPECM (blue and circles), and MECAPM
(grey and dashed line). The thick lines indicate the median and the colored areas the
interquartile range.
Figure ?? shows the results for bank systemicness (top panel) and indirect vul-
nerability (bottom panel). The three different colors refer to the three different
ensembles (see the figure caption for more details). We do not report the results
for the CECAPM because it is indistinguishable from the MECAPM one and this
fact can be understood by the argument in Eq. (10).
We observe that for each quarter BIPWCM strongly underestimates individual bank
systemicness and indirect vulnerability. The median relative error ranges roughly
between −60% and −70% and the interquartile range is very far from zero. The
estimator based on BIPECM (using the additional information on degrees) gives
slightly better results, even if a strong underestimation is still present. The median
relative error ranges roughly between −50% and −40% and again the interquartile
range is far from zero. On the contrary the estimator based on MECAPM (or
CECAPM) performs much better. The median relative error never goes below
−20% and almost always the interquartile range is centered around zero.23
23If instead we focus on the banks with higher systemicness or indirect vulnerability, the perfor-
mances of the estimator based on MECAPM worsen. In particular, for the quartile of banks with
33
In summary, the estimates of systemicness and indirect vulnerably for each single
bank as provided by the CECAPM-implied matrix are almost identical to those
obtained as the corresponding expected values on the MECAPM ensemble. Besides,
they are satisfactorily accurate and surely more reliable than those provided by
standard maximum entropy ensembles.
D Relation between CECAPM and the expected
Values under MECAPM
This appendix is dedicated to derive explicit formulas for the expected values of
bank systemicness and indirect vulnerability under the MECAPM ensemble. More-
over we show that these expected values are well approximated by the correspond-
ing values returned by the CECAPM-implied matrix. First note that, accord-
ing to equation (17), the element Xn,k is geometrically distributed with parameter
p = 1
1+XCAPMn,k
and thus
E
[
X2n,k
]− E [Xn,k]2 = 1− p
p2
= XCAPMn,k
(
XCAPMn,k + 1
)
.
Hence the expected value of the systemicness of bank n is given by24
E [Sn (X)] = E [Γn]
A?n
E?
B?n
= `
B?n
E?
K∑
k=2
(
E
[
X2n,k
]
+
∑
m 6=n
E [Xn,k] E [Xn,k]
)
= `
A?nB
?
n
E? L?
K∑
k=2
C?k
(
XCAPMn,k + C
?
k + 1
)
.
Note that since
Sn
(
XCAPM
)
= `
A?nB
?
n
E? L?
K∑
k=2
C?2k ,
it is
E [Sn (X)] = Sn
(
XCAPM
)
+ `
A?nB
?
n
E? L?
K∑
k=2
C?k
(
XCAPMn,k + 1
)
,
whence
E [Sn (X)]− Sn
(
XCAPM
)
Sn (XCAPM)
=
∑K
k=2C
?
k
(
XCAPMn,k + 1
)∑K
k=2C
?2
k
.
largest systemicness, the median percentage bias of the MECAPM estimator of systemicness is
always between −20% and −30%. Similarly, the median of the percentage bias in the estimation
of indirect vulnerability via MECAPM is always between −20% and −35%. Nevertheless, the
ranking among the three estimation methods remains unchanged.
24Remember that in our setting all the illiquidity parameters are set to a common value ` except
for the cash, which we assume to be the first class k = 1, for which it is set to zero, whence the
sum from k = 2 to k = K.
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This expression can be rewritten as
E [Sn (X)] = Sn
(
XCAPM
)(
1 +
A∗n
L∗
+
∑K
k=2Ck∑K
k=2C
?2
k
)
,
In order to evaluate the relative error above consider the simplified case in which
all the capitalization are almost equal C?k ≈ C? = L
?
K
, hence
E [Sn (X)]− Sn
(
XCAPM
)
Sn (XCAPM)
≈ (A
?
n +K)
L?
≈ A
?
n
L?
 1,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that L? =
∑N
n=1A
?
n.
Concerning the indirect vulnerability we have
E [IVn (X)] = `
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Now consider that B?m ≈ sB = 10, whence
E [IVn (X)] ≈ `
sB (1 + sB)
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Assume, again, for simplicity that Ck ≈ LK , thus
E [IVn (X)]− IVn
(
XCAPM
)
IVn (XCAPM)
≈ A
?
n +K
L?
≈ A
?
n
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